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• Clinicians at a fertility clinic recently announced that we face new ethical 
dilemmas because they had helped a sixty-three-year-old woman give birth 
to a healthy baby.1 
• Within days of the news of the cloning of a single sheep at a private research 
institute in Scotland, in February 1997,2 the President of the United States 
banned the use of Federal funds in research aimed at perfecting human 
cloning.3 
Do legal institutions have a role to play in resolving these ethical quandaries? 
To answer this and other questions raised by assisted reproductive technology, 
the National Advisory Board on Ethics in Reproduction4 (NABER) published its 
report on ovum transfer and a series of essays in New Ways of Making Babies: 
The Case of Egg Donation.5 NABER's report recommends removing any legal 
uncertainty as to whether the sixty-three-year-old "birth mother," rather than the 
younger ovum provider, is in fact the only mother of the child. Barring the 
possibility of"two mothers," presumably science and medicine can resolve most 
ethical issues associated with assisted reproduction. 
Why have political leaders in this and other Western countries so quickly 
proclaimed that any attempts at human cloning threaten basic notions of what it 
means to be human't Janet L. Dolgin, an anthropologist and lawyer, purports to 
answer this question in Defining the Family: Law, Technology, and Reproduction 
in an Uneasy Age.7 
In Professor Dolgin's view, the legal response to human cloning will likely 
require choosing between two conflicting conceptions of the family: (1) a 
traditional view of the family as something organic or "natural"; and (2) the 
I. Gina Kolata, A Record and Big Questions as Woman Gives Birth at 63, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
24, 1997, at AI. 
2. Gina Kolata, Scientist Reports First Cloning Ever of Adult Mammal, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 
1997, at AI. Ian Wilmut et al., Viable Offspring Derived from Fetal and Adult Mammalian Cells, 
385 NATURE 810 (1997). 
3. NATIONAL BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMMISSION, CLONING HUMAN BEINGS: REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NATIONAL BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMMISSION at 3, 87-90 (June 1997). 
Several bills were also introduced in the Congress and several states to prohibit human cloning. /d. 
at 88-90. 
4. NABER is a private sector panel with members from ethics, theology, law, medicine, and 
genetics. 
5. NEW WAYS OF MAKING BABIES: THE CASE OF EGG DoNATION 3-48 (Cynthia B. Cohen ed., 
1996). Cynthia B. Cohen was formerly the executive director of the National Advisory Board of 
Ethics in Reproduction. 
6. At this writing, at least the following countries have taken legislative and political steps to 
curtail attempts at human cloning: Germany, France, and the United Kingdom. CLONING HUMAN 
BEINGS, supra note 3, at 102. 
7. JANET L. DoLGIN, DEFINING THE FAMILY: LAW, TECHNOLOGY, AND REPRODUCTION IN AN 
UNEASY AGE (1997). Janet L. Dolgin is the Maurice A. Deane Distinguished Professor of Law at 
Hofstra University School of Law. 
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family as something individuals choose to form. Social and ideological changes 
prevalent in Western societies since the Industrial Revolution have created an 
ambivalence in society's and law's approaches to families. These cultural and 
social forces had already influenced law's responses to families by the 1960s, 
even while law had maintained traditional notions of the family as part of a social 
and moral universe. In seeking to prevent human cloning even before it is 
technically feasible, those against human cloning are simply trying to impose 
older ideas of the family as an integral and self-contained unit. 8 
Neither Dolgin's book nor Cohen's collection of essays can alone provide 
an adequate framework for the work lawyers do when they advise physicians, 
scientists, hospitals, universities, or lay individuals about assisted reproduction. 
Dolgin provides an excellent analysis of the family as an institution. She fails, 
however, to deal with law as a complex set of institutions-courts, legislatures, 
administrative agencies, and biomedical commissions-in defming public policy 
choices. As a book, New Ways of Making Babies is more than simply a 
publication ofNABER's report and its commissioned papers. It is the attempt by 
a private group to exercise the kind of influence on law previously exercised by 
publicly appointed bodies. The book attempts to discuss ovum transfer, a matter 
of great concern to assisted reproduction practitioners, as if the book itself was 
written by a public entity representing the public interest. 
I. THE PRIVATE VERSION 
OF "COMMISSIONING ETHICS"' 
Cohen divides New Ways of Making Babies into three parts. The first part, 
uProcedures and Policies at Four Oocyte Donation Centers,"10 contains descrip-
tions by practitioners of how their infertility centers have resolved issues 
associated with ovum transfer. 11 The second part, "Ethics and Policy Issues 
Raised by Egg Donation," contains papers by bioethics experts.12 The third and 
final part contains the NABER report. 13 
The four-section NABER report begins with a discussion of NABER's 
"values" about procreation, marriage, children, women, and adoption. The report 
thus asserts that this type of value analysis is the essence of public policy making 
8. DoLGIN, supra note 7, at 246. 
9. David Rothman coined the phrase "commissioning ethics• in his book, STRANGERS AT THE 
BEDSIDE: A HISTORY OF HOW LAW AND BIOETHICS TRANSFORMED MEDICAL DECISION-MAKING 168 
{1991). 
10. Oocyte is the biological term for an egg before maturation or fertilization. WEBSTER'S 
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1971 ). 
II. NEW WAYS OF MAKING BABIES, supra note 5, at 3-48. 
12.ld. at 51-230. 
13. This section is titled "Report and Recommendations on Oocyte Donation.• !d. at 231-302. 
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about the family, and is the appropriate way of dealing with matters of public 
policy and law.14 
Sections two and three of the report are organized around the ethical and 
policy issues physicians encounter with potential ovum providers and recipients.•s 
Considering that NABER was funded initially by the American Fertility Society 
(now the American Society ofReproductive Medicine) and the American College 
of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 16 it is not surprising that ethical debate is 
"physician·centered.m The underlying assumption of the report is that resolving 
the ethical dilemma of the practitioners in the fertility clinic effectively creates 
public policy and settles legal quandaries associated with assisted reproductive 
technology. 
The final section ofthe NABER report, "Public Policy and the Use of Oocyte 
Donation,"18 argues that we need legislation to clarify parental status following 
ovum donation. Although this section states that appropriate methods of keeping 
records must be established, it largely recommends that the medical profession 
must regulate itself. 19 Since the report's value analysis assumes there is some 
"fundamental right to procreative liberty" in ethics, and probably also within the 
Constitution of the United States, Professor John Robertson's theory of 
"procreative liberty" is featured. Robertson authored the commissioned paper on 
legal issues. 20 
Anyone not familiar with Robertson's views of the relationship of the 
constitutional analysis of liberty to assisted reproduction should read his chapter 
on legal uncertainty.21 For those already familiar with his work, it is important to 
consider some of the selections by ethicists in the collection who question 
14. /d at 237-4 7. For a critique of this view of the appropriate manner of determining public 
policy for law, see NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFEcr ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, 
ECONOMICS, AND PuBLIC POLICY 4-6 ( 1994). 
15. NEW WAYS OF MAKING BABIES, supra note 5, at248-69, 270-92. 
16. The group is now funded by several private foundations. 
17. After writing THE PHYSICIAN'S COVENANT: IMAGES OF THE HEALER IN MEDICAL ETHICS 
(1983), William F. May wrote THE PATIENT'S ORDEAL (1991 ), which dealt with the ethical dilemmas 
of the seriously injured, because he felt our public discourse had been skewed by an over .emphasis 
on the physician's ethical dilemma. I have suggested in another context that a physician~ntered 
view of ethics encourages us to ignore the effect of institutional arrangements on professional 
behavior. See Larry I. Palmer, Paying for Suffering: The Problem of Human Experimentation, 56 
MD. L. REv. 604 (1997) (suggesting we might learn some institutional lessons from the infamous 
Tuskegee Study of Syphilis in the Negro Male, viewing the study from the perspective of the 
fictional African-American public health nurse in David Feldshuh's play Miss Evers' Bays). 
18. NEW WAYS OF MAKING BABIES, supra note 5, at 293-302. 
19. /d. at 299-300, 301-02. 
20. John Robertson, Legal Uncertainties in Human Egg Donation, in NEW WAYS OF MAKING 
BABIES, supra note 5, at 175-87. I provide an extended critique of Professor Robertson's book on 
assisted reproduction, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLO. 
GIES (1994) in Larry I. Palmer, Life, Death, and Public Policy, 81 CORNELL L. REv. 161, 173-78 
(1995). 
21. Robertson, supra note 20, at 175-88. 
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Robertson's assumption that the important public policy issue is one of 
"balancing" the liberty of individuals against those of the majority. 22 For instance, 
Thomas Murray challenges the use of the language of"donation" and questions 
whether commercialization of ovum transfer by compensating providers 
undermines basic notions of the family.23 
Although New Ways of Making Babies contains diverse perspectives on the 
ethics of ovum transfer in its commissioned papers/4 there is little explicit 
discussion ofNABER's underlying conceptual framework about the relationship 
of law and public policy. The best way for lawyers to read this book is to start 
with the NABER report in order to understand NABER's overall perspective on 
law and public policy. One or more of the first four chapters on infertility 
practices gives a sense of the factual patterns envisioned by the commissioners. 
Finally, the commissioned papers themselves, depending upon the reader's 
interest25 or prior background in assisted reproduction, become intelligible.26 
This book is unlikely to become a reference book for legislators or other 
public officials because its framework is so court-centered. Further, the private 
commissioners fail to acknowledge that the effectiveness of most public 
commissions on medicine and science depends on political events and 
22. If Professor Robertson's theory is ultimately rejected by the United States Supreme Court 
or, perhaps more important for lawyers, ignored by legislatures or state courts, the public policy and 
legal framework constructed by this private commission may indeed prove less useful to legislatures, 
courts, or lawyers trying to advise clients than the commissioners might want. In the United States 
Supreme Court's recent opinion upholding the constitutionality of laws against assisted suicide, the 
majority opinion by Chief Rehnquist analyzed the meaning of •fundamental rights" in constitutional 
methodology. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258,2267-68 (1997). Such consideration does 
not undermine the importance of family privacy in constitutional interpretation or legislative 
consideration of assisted reproduction, but it might lead a lawyer to ask questions or structure 
transactions differently in what may remain an ethically and legally uncertain environment. 
23. Thomas H. Murray is a professor of Biomedical Ethics and Director of the Center for 
Biomedical Ethics in the School ofMedicine, Case Western Reserve University. He is a member of 
President Clinton's National Bioethics Advisory Commission. 
24. NEW WAYS OF MAKING BABIES, supra note 5, at 3-230. 
25. In reading some of the commissioned papers, one should be aware that several of the papers 
are written by members or staff members of NABER. For example, Cynthia Cohen (who wrote 
Parents Anonymous, in NEW WAYS OF MAKING BABIES, supra note 5, at 88-1 05) and Ruth Macklin 
(who wrote What Is Wrong with Commodification?, in NEW WAYS OF MAKING BABIES, supra note 
5, at 106-21) are respectively the vice-chair and executive director ofNABER. 
26. NABER's members and goals initially appear similar to those of other national 
commissions appointed by Congress or the President. Its members, which include two prominent 
law professors, come from a variety of disciplines. It published its commissioned papers and report 
to assist "the body of policy makers on the national and state level who must risk addressing this 
politically explosive topic" of ovum transfer. NEW WAYS OF MAKING BABIES, supra note 5, at xix. 
The papers are divided into those that are •pro" or "con• on the issue of ovum transfer, stances that 
vary with changing contexts: paying women for their ova, anonymity of participants, the age of 
recipients, insurance payment for assisted reproduction, or the effect on children born of this 
particular process of assisted reproduction . 
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leadership.27 The fundamental problem ovum transfer presents-the relationship 
of biology to the social and legal meaning of family-is only alluded to in some 
of the commissioned papers.28 
II. ASSISTED REPRODUCTION AND 
FAMILIES-THROUGH-CHOICE 
Dolgin's Defining the Family addresses these issues through a careful 
analysis of constitutional cases dealing with marriage, sexual privacy, and unwed 
fathers, as well as state cases dealing with assisted reproduction.29 Defining the 
Family seeks to raise questions rather than provide answers to the quandaries 
occasioned by the advent of reproductive technology.3° Professor Dolgin traces 
the long-term transformation of the family from its hierarchical feudal origins to 
a more modem notion of family as a group of individuals who choose to be 
relatives. She develops her thesis that "families-through-choice" was an ideology 
underlying the law's response to family dynamics by the 1960s, and that, at least 
in the minds of judges, this ideology continues to co-exist with an earlier organic 
ideology of the family. 
Dolgin's book shares the tendency with Cohen's to be court-centered in its 
analysis oflaw. Dolgin assumes that the policy choice is between an ideology of 
status or hierarchy, on one hand, and an ideology of family formed though 
27. At the state level, the New York State Task Force on Life and the Law has been influential 
in shaping that state's law regarding the ethical issues associated with medicine. THE REPoRT OF THE 
NEW YORK TASK FORCE ON LIFE, WHEN DEATH IS SOUGHT: ASSISTED SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA 
IN THE MEDICAL CONTEXT (1994), not only recommended no change in New York statutes regarding 
assisted suicide, but was relied upon by the United States Supreme Court in upholding the 
constitutionality of those statutes. See Quill v. Vacco, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997). At the national level 
over the past twenty-five years, we have grown accustomed to legal bodies or officials asking blue 
ribbon panels to make recommendations about ethical dilemmas in science and medicine. In 1972 
for instance, public outcry over the revelations of a forty-year study of untreated syphilis among 
rural African-American males in Tuskegee precipitated Congress's establishment of the National 
Commission for Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research. Since then, 
several prominent commissions at both the federal and state levels have made recommendations on 
policy and legal matters. The most recent example of what Professor David Rothman has labeled 
"Commissioning Ethics" is President Clinton's appointment of a National Bioethics Advisory 
Commission, chaired by the President of Princeton University, Harold T. Shapiro, a distinguished 
economist. 
28. See, e.g., Lisa Sowle Cahill, Moral Concerns about Institutionalized Gamete Donation, in 
NEW WAYS OFMAKINGBABIES,supra note 5, at 74-77. 
29. DoLGIN, supra note 7, at 32-62. 
30. She points out in her conclusion: 
In the late 1970s and 1980s, the responses of the law and of society more generally to the changing 
family were challenged dramatically by the advent of the new reproductive technologies and the 
appearance of surrogacy arrangements. Whether these phenomena, espec;ially those that depended on 
developments in science, appeared coincidentally with broad changes in the family, or appeared only 
after society was ready, however fitfully, to accept them, is a question for historians of science. 
/d. at 248-49. 
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individual choice or "intent,"31 on the other. She fails to consider that the public 
policy choice for law is to detennine which legal institution, if any, should 
attempt to resolve a particular problem of assisted reproduction. Once the 
institutional choice is seen as the public policy choice, the ideological differences 
about the conception of the family Dolgin so astutely describes would become 
important in recognizing the questions and analyzing those particular resolutions. 
Thus her analysis reduces itself to elucidating courts' responses to the broader 
ideological changes affecting the family.32 
For example, Dolgin analyzes McDonald v. McDonald,33 a New York 
divorce case involving a dispute over the custody of twins born through the 
process of ovum transfer. At a preliminary stage of their divorce proceedings, the 
husband attempted to obtain sole custody of the twin girls who were born shortly 
before the couple separated. The parties were respectively a medical doctor (the 
wife) and a podiatrist (the husband). 
Dolgin provides the reader with a rich sense of how this particular case 
illustrates the tensions between various conceptions of parenthood. The husband 
emphasized that his genetic link, and by implication his wife's lack of genetic 
link, to the twins meant he was the only "natural parent" of the twins. The wife 
focused on her gestational role in bringing the children into the world, and by 
implication the difference in female and male roles in reproduction. For Dolgin, 
the trial court and the appellate court sided with the wife on the theory that she 
was the "natural mother" and cast her claim within a traditional notion of the 
family.34 
Dolgin's analysis makes for a compelling story, particularly for her hero, the 
husband; but I will retell the story from the perspective of judges dealing with a 
litigated divorce matter. In this version, I will emphasize the factors important in 
marital dissolution and argue that courts should not resolve conflicting concep-
tions of the family within the context of divorce. 
First, the husband filed suit for divorce and sought sole custody of the twins 
prior to their birth.35 The wife opposed this motion and sought temporary custody 
with visitation for the husband pending a resolution at trial. On the basis of the 
affidavits filed by both parties, the trial judge denied the husband's motion for 
31. Chapter 3, States and Contract in Su"ogate Motherhood, DoLGIN, supra note 7, at 63-93, 
is an example of how Dolgin sees policy choice. 
32. Dolgin indicates that "the term ideology may include, but does not primarily refer to, a set 
of political beliefs. Rather, the term refers to the pervasive forms in terms of which people 
understand what it means to be human.• Jd. at 255 n.l. 
33. McDonald v. McDonald, 608 N.Y.S.2d 477 (1994). Dolgin discusses other surrogate cases 
such as Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993), and Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 
1992), in Chapter 5, Social Implications of Biological Transformation, DoLGIN, supra note 7, at 134-
75. 
34. DoLGIN, supra note 7, at 156. 
35./d. at 150. The twins were born on February 3, 1991. 
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sole custody, granted the wife's motion for temporary custody, and increased the 
amount of visitation for the husband.36 
The trial court's reasoning was somewhat straightforward for a divorce case. 
The wife was undisputedly the "birth mother" of the four-month-old twins who 
had been living with her. Additionally, New York, like many states, has a statute 
that presumes that a child born during a marriage is the "legitimate" child of the 
marriage. 37 At this preliminary stage of the proceeding, the legislative presump-
tion was fully operative for a trial judge. 
Second, the trial and appellate courts treated the husband's two other related 
requests pragmatically with the objective of minimizing the amount of court time 
spent on resolving the disputes between the parties and their lawyers. The trial 
court denied the husband's request for an order compelling the fertility center to 
disclose his wife's medical records.38 The appellate court approved this denial by 
narrowly interpreting the waiver of the physician-patient privilege in custody 
disputes. On the other hand, the appellate court reversed the trial judge's denial 
of an order to change the twins' birth certificates so that their last names were the 
husband's rather than his wife's maiden name on the theory that this order tended 
to support the legitimacy of the children.39 
Neither the published reports of the case nor Dolgin's analysis tell us how 
the issue of post-divorce custody or visitation was resolved. Moreover, visitation 
and custody arrangements tend to change over time. The judges, without any 
explicit legislative authority on in vitro fertilization in New York, correctly 
applied the existing institutional framework of divorce to the dispute. This 
included the legislative presumption governing the paternity of children born 
during a marriage.40 
36. The initial visitation award for the father was four hours per week of visitation supervised 
by the child's maternal grandmother. McDonald v. McDonald, 627 N.Y.S.2d 758 (1995). 
37. "Where the action for divorce is brought by the husband, the legitimacy of a child born or 
begotten before the commission of the offense charged is not affected by a judgment dissolving their 
marriage; but the legitimacy of any other child of the wife may be determined as one of the issues 
in the action. In the absence of proof to the contrary, the legitimacy of all the children begotten 
before the commencement of the action must be presumed." N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW§ 175(2) 
(McKinney 1988). 
38. The husband had filed an action against the fertility center claiming fraud. As Dolgin points 
out in her notes, the husband claimed he was first told that the children were produced with donor 
sperm because his sperm were inadequate to fertilize the ovum. In addition, he claimed his wife had 
originally told him that the pregnancy resulted from fertilization of her own ovum. As late as 1994, 
the husband was still seeking to determine the identity of the ovum donor. DOLGIN, supra note 7, 
at 265-66 n.3S. One might wonder about the "ethics" of a clinic dealing with a married couple in 
such a manner. At least the NABER recommends that the clinic clearly inform the couple about the 
nature of the process. NEW WAYS OF MAKING BABIES, supra note 5, at251. 
39. McDonald, 608 N.Y.S.2d at 480-81. 
40. Of course, litigated cases represent a very skewed distribution of the actual experiences of 
children and couples going through the divorce process. For analysis of the effect of skewed 
distribution, see KOMESAR, supra note 14, at 76-79. 
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From an institutionalist's perspective, the real question is whether a court 
should abandon the legislative framework for resolving custody disputes in the 
context of divorce because assisted reproductive technology was used to produce 
the children. Whether the use of in vitro fertilization should make a difference in 
how the custody dispute is framed is a legislative rather than a judicial decision. 41 
lfboth courts and legislatures have limited capacity to shape the institution of the 
family in a complex society,42 then the judges in the McDonald case used legal 
intervention to provide an incentive for the parties and their lawyers to resolve 
the dispute themselves prior to a full litigated trial. By reaching a result on 
narrow grounds, the McDonald court left it to the legislature to consider changing 
the framework. In other words, it may not be appropriate for courts in divorce 
actions to determine if a "gestational" or "genetic" mother is the "natural mother 
for all purposes" as Dolgin implies. But what Dolgin and most other legal 
scholars fail to recognize is that legislation is difficult to pass in our process, and 
what emerges is not necessarily comprehensive. It usually takes some change in 
the political equilibrium for legislation to pass.43 
For a number of reasons, the prospect of "human cloning" might just be such 
an equilibrium~shifting event in the public perception of assisted reproduction. 
As President Clinton announced a ban on the use of federal funds to support 
research on human cloning, he asked his recently appointed National Bioethics 
Advisory Commission to report within ninety days on the issues raised by the 
sheep cloning.44 
The recommendations of this commission illustrate how our political 
processes do not result in grand ideological resolution about the nature of family 
and human relationships. Even though the commission recommended legislation 
to ban human cloning, only the attempt at what is called somatic cell infusion 
would be prohibited under the commission's recommendations. This means that 
many things called "human cloning" (such as splitting an embryo) would not be 
prohibited by the recommendations. Nor would the practice of ovum donation be 
prohibited, or many aspects of laboratory research on animal embryos. 
41. There had been some discussion in New York about proposed legislation that would have 
made the McDonald's result clearly correct. At one point, the Special Committee on Biotechnology 
and the Law of the New York State Bar Association proposed an amendment that would clearly have 
made the wife in McDonald a parent for the purposes of divorce. That amendment was never enacted 
into law. See Larry I. Palmer, Who Are the Parents of Biotechnological Children?, 35 JURJMETRICS 
J. 17, 19-22 (1994). Some states have statutes that specifically recognize the married couples' 
intentions as legally determinative of rearing rights and duties in offspring. OKLA. STAT. tit. I 0, § 
554 (Supp. 1998); N.D. CENT. CODE§§ 14-18-01 to -07 (1991); VA. CODE ANN.§ 20-158 (Mich. 
1995 & Supp. 1997). 
42. Larry I. Palmer, A Rejoinder, 35 JURJMETRJCS J. 51, 52-53 (1994). 
43. Palmer, supra note 17, at 616-22. 
44. It is worth noting that people are opposed to something that is not at present a technological 
reality (in contrast to something such as ovum transfer). 
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This highly diverse commission's main justification for its prohibition 
against human cloning is concern with the safety of the process for humans. 
Given its respect for science, this group recommended that the prohibition be 
time~limited, recognizing that future scientific research might undermine the 
commission's concern for safety. Thus, if and when the ratio of success of animal 
cloning moves to something less than the one in 278 tries it took to create one 
adult sheep called Dolly, the debate can theoretically reopen. At present, there 
appears to be a political consensus that any specialists who attempt human 
cloning by using somatic cell transfer would be involved in an experiment that 
should be considered too dangerous to undertake.45 In effect, basic scientific 
research on all forms of cloning-the institution of science-was protected in the 
Commission's process, but the attempts to transfer this knowledge to the human 
realm-medicine-were temporarily halted.46 
But, if the cloning of one sheep represents something "new" or novel in 
scientific understanding, rather than simply a technological innovation, the 
influence of science on other institutions may be long~range rather than the 
imposition of some dramatic new law. If mammalian cloning represents a new 
understanding of how cells operate, the current concern with human cloning may 
pale in significance as the implications for the understanding of human disease 
and the aging process begin to affect medicine and perhaps even our legal 
concepts of the family. 47 
Finally, there is no clear winner in the ideological battle between those who 
believe the family must be grounded in some shared basic biological understand~ 
ing and those who believe in the ideology of choice. This lack of definitive 
resolution means the lawyer must act under the circumstances of a dynamic 
uncertainty, caused by the institutional power of science. 
While Dolgin's analysis forces lawyers to consider the interaction of law and 
the family, her analysis does not consider science as a major institutional player 
in which assisted reproductive technologies are eventually offered to prospective 
patients. Thus the alliance of science and medicine as institutions is submerged 
under an otherwise engaging social and historical analysis of the family and 
recent judicial responses to issues related to the family.48 Professor Dolgin 
45. CLONING HUMAN BEINGS, supra note 3, at 107. 
46. Science rather than medicine provides the institutional dynamics for the "human cloning• 
debate. The assisted reproduction practitioner is close to the image of the healer, but the scientist is 
both magician and Frankenstein. In other words, we might trust the doctor, but fear the "mad 
scientist." 
47. Since the cloning of a sheep, the scientists in Scotland have created a transience sheep, one 
with a human gene. Gina Kolata, Lab Yields Lamb with Human Gene, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 25, 1997, 
at A IS. The implications of third discovery for human medicine are enormous. This second cloned 
sheep produces milk containing a human protein, Factor X, which could help hemophiliacs. 
Currently, hemophiliacs are healed with Factor X taken from human blood donations or cell cultures. 
Cloned Sheep May Help Human Hemophiliacs, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1997, at A25. 
48. Dolgin does not deal extensively with an economic analysis of the family. She makes only 
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provides an important part of the framework (particularly a perspective on the 
family as an institution) that a lawyer needs in dealing with clients, fertility 
clinics, and even Jaw students concerned with assisted reproduction. 
_____ , 
The lawyer undertaking to defme legal issues raised by egg transfer must be 
able to analyze more than the relevant legislation, cases, or administrative rulings. 
The lawyer needs some grasp of the larger social framework. Lawyers must learn 
to ask the kinds of questions legislative or judicial bodies might be asking.49 
Pursuing this line of logic, the political response to animal cloning in recent 
months should remind lawyers that there might be "paradigm" shifts occurring in 
science. A major shift in science should alert lawyers to the possibility that there 
could be a shift in the political equilibrium concerning the practice of ovum 
transfer. Legislatures might then alter the institutional arrangement in which the 
"market," the institutions of medicine and science, defines the ethics of assisted 
reproduction. 
Let's return to our opening inquiry and contemplate again the geriatric (or 
"post-menopausal") mother. An institutional analysis of assisted reproduction 
helps to distinguish between that which disturbs us as citizens, parents, and 
lawyers and those important social problems calling for institutional response. 
First, is the sixty-three-year-old, first-time mother really an important social 
problem requiring legislation or regulation to govern the age a woman can be a 
recipient of egg transfer? My answer is "no. • My reasoning starts with the 
proposition that there is no general line a court or a legislature could draw when 
a woman is too old to be a mother other than something about what is reasonable 
under the circumstances. The clientele for ovum transfer are generally already 
"old" for first-time mothers and therefore already at greater medical risks to their 
health than, say, twenty-five-year-old, frrst-time mothers. Trying to set the outer 
limits through a regulatory or legislative process on the maximum age at which 
birth may occur, assuming some reasonable amount of medical screening by the 
clinic, is virtually impossible or meaningless. 50 
implicit references to child support issues in her discussion of issues arising because of artificial 
insemination. DoLGIN, supra note 7, at 196-97. A more complete institutional analysis of the family 
might look at support actions as the remaining area of •status• in our notions of family and should 
be studied as such. For instance, a lower court in New York held a woman who had undergone a sex 
change liable for support for children born through the process of artificial insemination on the 
premise she had mispresented herself to the physician as the husband of the woman for whom the 
physician performed artificial insemination, and therefore undertook a duty to support the children. 
Karin T.v. Michael T., 127 Misc.2d 14, 484 N.Y.2d 780 (Family Court, Monroe Co. 1985). 
49. See Palmer, supra note 20. 
SO. NEW WAYS OF MAKING BABIES, supra note 5, at S. Some of the centers described in 
Cohen's book, for instance, set the age limit at 50, while others had no absolute age limit. 
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At a pragmatic level, I see no compelling reason to put the problem of the 
post-menopausal mother on the political agenda. In my view of family as a 
private institution, there are some dilemmas that properly belong only to the 
members of the family. The sixty-three-year-old mother and her sixty-year-old 
husband-father who had the resources to come from London to Los Angeles for 
the ovum transfer might be trusted to think through the social and legal risks of 
their decisions to have a child at this stage of their lives. I hardly believe this is 
a child who might end up in foster care if the mother and father died prior to its 
reaching maturity. Surely this couple can find lawyers who can use existing legal 
instruments to protect the child as much as possible from its parents' deaths or 
disabilities. 
Given that political resources, like everything else in society are limited, 51 
the best response from legislatures may be no or very little response to deep 
ethical issues raised by ovum transfer. The best response from courts to cases that 
come before them is to resolve them narrowly, and on non-constitutional 
grounds, since legislatures rather than courts are the least detrimental legal means 
of changing the nature of family. In the end, the social and cultural forces 
analyzed by Dolgin have as much influence on the nature of family as do judicial 
rulings and legislative enactments. 
For the moment, the NABER report is correct-assisted reproduction 
practitioners must struggle with the sixty-three-year-old, ftrst-time mothers. 
Cohen's collection represents what might be called the "best practices" for ovum 
transfer and provides recommendations as to resolving some of the issues. The 
collection provides lawyers with a good sense of current thinking among 
practitioners of assisted reproduction. But the book does not provide a framework 
for dealing with issues on the frontier, such as human cloning. 
Defining the Family represents the best book for lawyers to read on the 
problems of assisted reproduction. The important insight for lawyers in Dolgin's 
book is that the law's response to the family reflects the broader cultural, social, 
and economic functions of the family. Consequently, she presents a view of the 
family as a social institution. In other words, our high rates of divorce and single 
parenting are not new statistically, but rather continuations of trends begun 
during the Industrial Revolution.52 
What is lacking in these multidisciplinary approaches to assisted reproduc-
tion is "comparative institutional analysis."53 In a comparative institutional 
approach to law, the correct public policy choice is sometimes to allow non-legal 
51. Positive political theory helps us understand that court resources are limited, but few legal 
scholars consider political resources limited. In our court-centered view of the world, we have a kind 
of rigid legal process view that delegates to legislatures tasks that are often beyond their institutional 
competence. Arriving at a uniform commercial code might be an easier task than redefining parent 
for a legislature. See Palmer, supra note 41, at 52-54. 
52. DoLGIN, supra note 7, at 2&-29. 
53. See KOMESAR, supra note 40. 
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institutions such as "science" or "medicine" to be the primary forum for policy 
debate and resolution. Such an approach would consider science and medicine 
as institutions with certain limitations, just as all institutions have limited 
competencies. When considering these limitations, the important point of legal 
analysis is to determine which legal institution-if any-is the corrective for the 
social malfunctioning of science or medicine. 
In general, legislatures rather than courts are the correctives for science or 
medicine. The "law" of assisted reproduction technology may be made in 
incremental steps in legislative and administrative bodies and in lawyers' offices 
because family is in fact a private institution, difficult to regulate, and thus 
constitutionally protected.54 
54. A complete analysis of the role of the distinction between public and private institutions 
is beyond the scope of this review. See PALMER, supra note 20, at 171 n.67. One task of such an 
undertaking would be to distinguish between marriage-which is a public institution-and 
family-which is a private institution-in constitutional analysis. The recent case of ML.B. v. S.L.J., 
117 S. Ct. 555 (1997), in which the Court held that the state must furnish an indigent divorcee with 
a transcript for an appeal from the termination of her parental status, might be the starting point for 
such an analysis. 
WINTER 1998 235 
